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is not an essential factor to the granting of such 
is to endeavor to lift oneself by one's own bootstraps. 
On the record before this court plaintiff is clearly entitled 
to injunctive relief against defendant, and the judgment 
should, therefore, be reversed. 
concurred. 
SCHAUER, 
in my entitle the plaintiff 
require reversal of the judgment . 
evidence and the findings, 
to injunctive relief and 
.Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 21, 
1954. Carter, Traynor, ,J., and Schauer, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22991. In Bank. ,June 25, 1954.] 
LIVINGSTON HOCK AND GRAVEIJ COMPANY (a Cor-
poration) et al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF LOS 
ANGELES, Appellant. 
[1] Zoning-Police Power.-Zoning ordinances, when reasonable 
in object and not arbitrary in operation, constitute a justifiable 
exercise of police power. 
[2] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.-The rights of users of 
property as those rights existed under prevailing zoning con-
ditions at time of adoption of rezoning ordinance must be 
protected. 
[3] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.-A provision which ex-
empts existing nonconforming uses is ordinarily included in 
rezoning ordinances because of hardship and doubtful consti-
tutionality of compelling immediate discontinuance of non-
conforming uses. 
[4] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.-Zoning legislation looks 
to futurn in regulating district development and eventual 
liquidation of nonconforming uses within prescribed period 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Zoning, § 5 et seq.; Am.Jur., Zon-
ing,§ 10. 
[3] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Zoning, § 19; Am.Jur., Zoning, 
§ 146 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4, 6, 7, 10] Zoning; [5] Constitutional 
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commensurate with inyestment 
be 
0.2d 
Power. -Implicit in theory of 
power, differentiated from power of eminent 
that incidental to an individual will not 
in case. 
for 
morals and general 
and unrea~onable application 
[6] Zoning-Existing Nonconforming Uses.-Hc:wning regulations 
which operators of a cement hatching plant to continue 
their use of property for 20 years as an "auto-
matic exception" to rezoning restrictions, but which authorize 
revocation of such exception where it can be done without 
impairment of "constitutional rights," are not unconstitutional. 
[7] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.--There can be no constitu-
tional objection to provision in a rezoning ordinance which 
authorizes planning commission to revoke an automatic excep-
tion where, after a public hearing on notice, it is found that 
nonconforming use is so exercised as to be detrimental to public 
health or safety or as to be a nuisance; revocation of right 
to continue a previously existing lawful business because of 
such finding would he legitimate exercise of police power. 
[8] Administrative Law-Court Review-Remedies.- Either cer-
tiorari or mandamus is appropriate remedy to test proper 
exercise of discretion vested in a local board. 
[9] !d.-Court Review-Issues.-In certiorari or mandamus pro-
ceedings to review action of local board, the chief issues are 
whether person affec·ted has lwen accorded a hearing and, if 
so, whether there is any evidence to support order of such 
board. 
[10] Zoning-Injunctive Relief From Interference With Business 
Operated Under Excepted Use.-Operators of a cement hatch-
ing plant are not entitled to injunctive relief against enforce-
ment of county zoning ordinance which would prohibit them 
from conducting such plant in a rezoned district, where tran-
script of hearing before regional planning commission is not 
part of record of case, notwithstanding fact that plain-
tiffs admittedly complied with smog and air pollution regu-
latory requirements their plant might still be so operated as 
to be detrimental to public health or safety or as to be a 
nuisance, where propriety of planning commission's finding on 
these issues cannot be determined without recourse to pro-
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional r~aw, § 144 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Constitutional Law, § 245. 
Action to ordinance 
in a rezoned 
Denio, Hart, Taubman & for Respondents. 
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the county of 
Los Angeles from enforcing against them certain zoning ordi-
mmce provisions which would prohibit them from conducting 
a cement mixing plant in a rezoned district. They recovered 
judgment upon the that the ordinance provisions 
in question could not be constitutionally applied to require 
the removal of their existing business as a nonconforming 
use, and therefore ''any action purportedly taken under . . . 
snch provisions [was] invalid and [had] no effect as to ... 
plaintiffs.'' Defendant challenges the propriety of this judg-
ment on these gTounds : the ordinance are 
not constitutionally objectionable in application to plaintiffs' 
business; and (2) plaintifts' remedy is by writ of certiorari 
or mandamus, precluding injunctive or declaratory relief. 
Settled principles of law sustain defendant's position. 
'l'he Pacific l~lectric Hailway owned a parcel of 
land in an area in Los Angeles County known as the Artesia 
Industrial District. 'rhe area was used exclusively for in-
dustrial and manufacturing purposes. Over Pacific Electric's 
land there passed a main double track railway line with two 
separate spur tracks to serve the neighboring eommercial 
and industrial plants. On ,J a nnary 31, 1950, Pacific Electric 
leased 20,000 square feet of its land to plaintiffs. At that 
time all of this area was in an M-3 zone , under 
ordinance No. 1494 (new series) of the of Los Angeles, 
permitting any building structure or improvement to be 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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erected, established or maintained thereon without .,..,<,tT'lnl"l 
as to use or occupancy. 
Plaintiffs erected on the leased property a hatching plant 
for the loading of readymix concrete mixer trucks with con-
crete aggregates, a use then permissible in any M-3 zone in 
the county. The plant was erected pursuant to a building 
permit issued by the county building department and was 
completed prior to March 21, 1950. Plaintiffs complied with 
all the smog control and air pollution ordinances of the 
county, and they secured a permit authorizing the operation 
of their plant and certifying that after inspection, it had 
been found to be complying with these requirements. The 
plant cost $18,000 to build; $80,000 worth of mixer trucks 
were purchased; and both the plant and trucks have been 
in continuous operation. 
On March 21, 1950, after the erection and operation of 
the plant and purchase of the trucks, the county adopted an 
urgency ordinance (No. 5508) rezoning the Artesia Industrial 
District into an M-1 zone (light manufacturing). Upon such 
rezoning, existing uses were protected as automatic excep-
tions ( § 531) with such structure as plaintiffs' plant allowed 
20 years for continued use unless such time period should 
be extended or the automatic exception should be revoked 
as provided in the amending ordinance. Section 533 provided 
for the revocation of an automatic exception ''if the [Regional 
Planning) Commission finds: (a) That the condition of the 
improvements, if any, on the property are such that to require 
the property to be used only for those uses permitted in 
the zone where it is located would not impair the constitu-
tional rights of any person; (b) That the nature of the 
improvements are such that they can be altered so as to be 
used in conformity with the uses permitted in the zone in 
which such property is located without impairing the con-
stitutional rights of any person." Section 649, as here mate-
rial, authorized the planning commission, after a public hear-
ing as therein provided, to "revoke or modify any permit, ex-
ception or other approval whieh has been g-ranted either auto-
matically or by special action of either the Board of Super-
visors or the Commission, pursuant to . . . the provisions 
of [the] ordinance [where] (e) . . . the use for which the 
approval was granted is so exercised as to be detrimental 
to the public health or safety, or so as to be a nuisance." 
On November 25, 1950, plaintiffs received a notice through 
the mail that a hearing would be held December 1, 1950, 
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before the Regional Planning Commission with reference to 
the revocation of their exception. Pacific Electric, owner 
of the property, was never given notice of the hearing. Fol-
lowing the scheduled public hearing and on December 6, 
1950, the planning commission notified plaintiffs that their 
"use of the property with a cement hatching plant thereon" 
was ''being exercised in such a manner as to be detrimental 
to public health, and so as to be a nuisance"; and that their 
to operate their plant was therefore revoked "effective 
as of January 31st, 1952." On January 16, 1951, plaintiffs 
appealed to the county board of supervisors, which affirmed 
the planning commission's decision. In .August, 1951, the 
board added to the basic zoning ordinance (No. 1494) section 
404 of ordinance No. 5800, expressly confirming the expira-
tion date on plaintiffs' exception as "January 31, 1952." 
Thereafter plaintiffs brought this action seeking ( 1) to enjoin 
defendant county from ''interfering with'' the operations of 
the cement hatching plant "after January 31, 1952" and 
( 2) to have the court "declare the rights and duties of plain-
tiffs and defendant with respect to the property and hatching 
plant . . . and determine the construction and validity of 
the purported action taken by [the] Regional Planning Com-
mission . ~ . '' 
Defendant admitted in its answer that its proceedings 
against plaintiffs were not taken under the provisions of 
section 3491 of the Civil Code relating to the abatement of 
a public nuisance but rather were instituted under authority 
of sections 533 and 649 of the zoning ordinance, supra, pro-
viding for the "revocation of automatic exceptions." The 
trial court determined that these sections, as well as section 
404, supra, affirming the expiration date on plaintiffs' ex-
ception, were ''invalid'' in permitting ''unconstitutional en-
croachments" upon plaintiffs' property rights and therefore 
''any action . . . taken'' by the Regional Planning Commis-
sion "under . . . such provisions [was] invalid and [would J 
have no effect as to ... plaintiffs." Upon such premise the 
court expressly refrained from making "any findings as to 
what occurred at the l1earing before the Regional Planning 
Commission on December 1, 1950, or whether or not there 
was any competent evidence at said hearing to prove any 
eanse for revocation." Plaintiffs accordingly were granted 
the injunctive relief sought. Defendants attack the propriety 
of snch judgment npon the merits as well as upon the pro-
eedural phases. 
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amendment may not be to require 
the removal of their business from the rezoned dis-
trict. maintain that their unlimited right to operate 
their cement in the district, a lawful use of 
the could not be curtailed or 
limited rezoning without violating the consti-
tutional of due process of law. 'I' hey on Jones 
v. C-ity Los 211 Cal. 304 [295 P. 14], wherein 
the court refused to apply so as to destroy a 
valuable sanatorium an ordinance which prohibited 
such institutions in areas r("zoned as residential. Under the 
particular circumstances of that case, showing "substantial 
injury'' to be involved 321), it was deemed unreasonable 
and arbitrary to destroy the established enterprise. But 
each case must be determined on its own facts. (Of. Beverly 
Oil Co. v. City Los Angeles, 40 Cal.2d 552, 560 [254 P.2d 
865] .) 
Moreover, the ordinance under consideration in the Jones 
case differed from the one here involved. There 
tl1e ordinance, cast in the form of a penal statute rather than 
in the form of a comprehensive zoning law, prohibited the 
maintenance of sanitariums of a certain type in designated 
districts. By its terms the ordinance, unlike the ordinary 
zoning laws, to have both a retroactive as well as 
a prospective effect, automatically prohibiting the 
continued maintenance of several established sanitariums 
representing ]arge investments. In other words, no provision 
was made for any automatic exception for existing noncon-
forming nses. In the case, the zoning ordinance 
does provide for automatic exceptions of reasonable duration 
for nonconforming useR, however, to earlier 
revocation of the automatic if the use for which 
approval was is so exereised 
to the health or or so 
( § 649, ; and the power 
the question Of Whether the nl",()T\,Pl't" 
"as to be detrimental 
as to be a nuisance" 
upon notice, 
so used was 
T,IIT,OSTO~ HocK ETC. 
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T\2d 41 
Commission. a result 
not urge that the 
in the ,Jones case is the appro-
in the present ease. It is that the 
available to 
pn'Yc~ntiYe, ll"<l,V of all aeti,m fnr relief; 
will hereillafter appear, other remedies were available in 
the ease to review the action taken the 
C'omrnission in revoking 
[2] 'l'he rigbts of the users of rights 
existed under prevailiJJg zoning eonditions are well recognized 
and have always been (Edmonds v. County of Los 
A 40 Cal.2cl 642, GGJ [2:)5 P.2d 772].) [3] Accord-
ingly, a prrrdsion 'which exempts existing nonconforming 
uses is ordinarily included in rezoning ordinances because of 
the hardship and doubtful coiJstitutionality of compelling the 
imr>wdiate discontinuance of nonconforming uses. (Ibid.) 
Prntedion of an undel'taking inyo\ving the investment 
of capital is akin to thE' protection of a nonconforming use 
existing at the time that rezoning conditions become effective. 
(County of San D'iego v. 111 cClurlcen, 37 Cal.2d 683, 691 
[ 2:~4 P .2c1 972].) [ 4] Ho\YeYer, zoning legislation looks 
to the future in regulating district development and the 
eventual liquidation of nonconforming uses within a pre-
scribed period commensurate with the investment involved. 
(Ibid. p. G86.) 'l'he mere fad that some hardship may 
thereby be experienced is not controlling, for "every exercise 
of the police power is apt to affect adversely the property 
interest of somebody." ( Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 
195 Cal. 497.512 [234 P. 888].) [5] Implicit in the theory 
of the police power, as differentiated from the power of 
eminent domain. is tlJe principle that incidental injury to 
an individual wi1l not prevent its operation, once it is shown 
to bP exercised for proper purposes of public health, safety, 
morals, and general welfare, and tJ1ere is no arbitrary and 
unreasonable application in the particular case. (Wilkins v. 
City of San Bernardino, supra, 29 Cal.2d 332, 338; Beverly 
Oil Co. v. C-ity of Los Angeles, supra, 40 Ca1.2d 552, 557.) 
[6] Here the rezoning permits plaintiffs to continue their 
nonconforming use of the property for 20 years as an "auto-
matic exeeption '' to the rezoning restrictions ( § 531, supra; 
Edmonds v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 40 Cal.2d 642, 
6fil) bnt authorizes revocation of such exception where it 
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can be done without the 
( § 533, . Manifestly, care has been taken in such re-
zoning regulations to refrain from the interference with 
constitutional guarantees, and in the of such express 
language it would be a contradiction in terms to hold that the 
regulations are nevertheless uneonstitutional. [7] IJike-
wise, there can be no constitutional to the authorized 
revocation by the planning commission of an automatic ex-
ception where after a public upon it is found 
that the nonconforming use is "so exercised as to be detri-
mental to the public health or safety, or so as to be a nuisance.'' 
( § 649, snpra; Ricciardi v. County of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. 
App.2d 569, 577 [252 P.2d 773n llevocation of the 
right to continue a previously existing lawful business because 
of such finding ·would be a legitimate exercise of the police 
power. (Ex parte Quong W o, 161 Cal. 220, 230 [118 P. 
714]; Jones v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 211 Cal. 304, 316; 
In re Jones, 56 Cal.App.2d 658, 663-664 [133 P.2d 418]; 
Cantrell v. Board of Supervisors, 87 Cal.App.2d 471, 477 
[197 P.2d 218].) It therefore follows that the rezon-
ing regulations authorizing the revocation of ''automatic 
exceptions'' are constitutionally valid as a whole and come 
within the prescribed objectives of the police power. There 
now remains the question of whether in application to plain-
tiffs' existing cement plant there has been an unconstitutional 
impairment of property rights. 
The llegional Planning Commission was a local board exer-
cising quasi-judicial powers under the ordinance in determin-
ing the facts in plaintiffs' case. (Greif v. Dullea, 66 CaL 
App.2d 986, 1009 [153 P.2d 581]; North Side etc. Assn. v. 
Hillside etc. Park, 70 Cal.App.2d 609, 616 [161 P.2d 618]; 
Cantrell v. Board of Supervisors, snpra, 87 CaLApp.2d 471, 
475.) [8] Either certiorari or man damns is an appro-
priate remedy to test the proper exercise of discretion vested 
in a local board. (Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d 
879, 881 [129 P.2d g49, 142 AI.~.R. 1383] ; La Prade v. De-
partment of Water & Powe·r, 27 Cal.2d 47,53 [162 P.2d 13].) 
[9] Under such review, the chief issues are whether the 
person affected has been accorded a hearing, and if so, whether 
there is any evidence to support the order of the local board. 
(Ibid.) 
[10] In the present case, the transcript of the hearing 
before the planning commission is not a part of the record. 
Plaintiffs allege that there was "no competent evidence to 
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prove any cause for revocation" in their case, and that Pacific 
owner of the property, was never given notice of 
as required by the ordinance regulations. In 
answer to this latter point, defendant asserts that ''Pacific 
Electric . . . was represented at the hearing," a voluntary 
appearance which eliminates any cause for complaint in 
to give the notice (see Hopkins v. MacCttl-
35 Cal.App.2d 451 P.2d 950]), and that in 
any event the presence of Pacific Electric was of no concern 
to plaintiffs in the determination of their case before the 
planning commission. Although plaintiffs admittedly did 
comply with smog and air pollution regulatory requirements, 
their plant might be still so operated "as to be detrimental 
to the public health or safety, or so as to be a nuisance." 
( § 649, supra.) The propriety of the planning commission's 
finding on these issues cannot be determined without recourse 
to the proceedings taken before it "in the manner provided 
by law" (Riccia,rdi v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 115 
Cal.App.2d 569, 580) and examination of the evidence there 
submitted. The validity of section 404 of the ordinance, 
snpra, affirming the expiration date of plaintiffs' right to 
continue the operation of their cement plant in the rezoned 
district, would necessarily depend on whether the planning 
commission's action was unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive 
in ordering revocation in plaintiffs' case. Under all the cir-
cumstances, plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law for 
review of the planning commission's proceedings, and there-
fore they are not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief. 
(North Side etc. Assn. v. Hillside etc. Park, supra, 70 Cal. 
App.2d 609, 615; Hostetter v. Alderson, 38 Cal.2d 499, 500 
[241 P.2d 230] .) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, ,J., and 'l'raynor, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The ordinance in this case changed the zone in which 
plaintiffs' bmdness (concrete aggregates loading plant) was 
then established to embrace only "light manufacturing" to 
which class plaintiffs' business did not belong. As is cus-
tomary, tl1e ordinance excepted from its operation for a 
period of 20 years, existing uses such as plaintiffs'. Yet in 
the next breath it provided that any exception could be 
revoked if the planning commission found that that could 
43 C.2d-5 
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be done without the constitutional rights of the 
existing user or where the use was detrimental to 
the ''public health or safety'' or was a ''nuisance.'' For 
all practical purposes, therefore, no exception was granted 
for existing uses because the exception could be taken away 
at any time, and in the case at bar, was taken away from 
plaintiffs with impunity. 
It is settled in this state as elsewhere that a 
nance which requires the discontinuance of 
uses existing when the ordinance was adopted is a deprivation 
of property without due process of law contrary to the federal 
and state Constitutions. (Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 
CaL 304 [295 P. 14]; Beverly Oil Co. v. Los Angeles, 
40 Cal.2d 552 [254 P.2d 865] ; Wilkins v. City of San Ber-
nardino, 29 CaL2d 332 [171 P.2d 542]; Clemons v. City of 
Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 95 [222 P.2d 439] ; Price v. Schwafel, 
92 Cal.App.2d 77 [206 P.2d 683]; Acker v. Baldwin, 18 
Cal.2d 341 [115 P.2d 455]; Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice, 
§ 133; 58 Am.Jur., Zoning, § 148; McQuillin, Municipal Cor-
porations (3d ed.), § 25.181.) In Village of Terrace Park 
v. Errett, 12 F.2d 240, a zoning ordinance was held invalid 
which prohibited plaintiff from operating his gravel process-
ing plant which was operating when the ordinance was 
passed. In In re Kelso, 147 Cal. 609 [82 P. 241, 109 Am. 
St.Rep. 178, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 796], it was held that an ordinance 
could not validly prohibit the maintenance of a rock quarry 
in the city. In Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 [25 
S.Ct. 18, 49 L.Ed. 169] (reversing our court's decision in 
Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal. 179 [72 P. 970, 
96 Am.St.Rep. 95] ) the court held an ordinance unconsti-
tutional which prohibited a gas works as applied to an exist-
ing gas works. 
As a zoning ordinance which does not exempt existing non-
conforming uses is invalid, it necessarily follows that an 
ordinance, like the one here, which excepts such uses but 
authorizes a planning commission to revoke those exceptions 
where the public safety or health is involved, is also invalid. 
If public health and safety (police , the basis for the 
zoning, cannot justify the destruction of existing uses, an 
administrative agency cannot be given such power. 'rhose 
uses cannot be eliminated unless inherently, or as exer-
cised, are nuisances. (Jones v. of Los Angeles, supra, 
211 Cal. 304.) 
Assuming the commission could be given the authority to 
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.-~.~·,a~·""'"' 0 that an nonconforming use was a nuisance, 
hence not under the exception for such uses, it is difficult 
to see how the ' business could be a nuisance. It is 
in an area zoned for light manufacturing. Hence there is no 
of the residents in a residential area. 
to conduct its business and it 
"smog control and air pollution" ordi-
of the case the majority reverses the 
an injunction in an action for preventive 
relief and in so doing states that plaintiffs 
cannot reYiew the action of the commission in a proceeding 
for declaratory relief or injunction. In effect the trial court 
is told to dismiss the action. .Although it is said in Hostetter 
38 Cal.2d 499 [241 P.2d 230], that a determina-
tion a local administrative agency cannot be reviewed in 
a declaratory relief action, it has been done (see Edmonds v. 
of Los 40 Cal.2d 642 [255 P.2d 772] ; Otis v. 
of Los A 52 Cal.App.2d 605 [126 P.2d 954]; 
v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 21 Cal.2d 399 [132 
P.2d 804]; 15 CaLTur.2d, Declaratory Relief, § 63; 2 Cal. 
.Administrative Law, § 199). In any event, the de-
claratory relief action may be treated as mandamus, a proper 
remedy for review (Hostetter v. Alderson, supr·a, 38 Cal.2d 
499; 2 Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 200), and it was 
alleged by plaintiffs that the commission had no competent 
evidence to prove any cause for revocation of its exemption 
from the ordinance. This should be pointed out to avoid a 
dismissal of the action. 
I am convinced that the trial court correctly applied the 
law to the facts of this case, and the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
SHENK, J., and SCHAUER, J.-We dissent. 
In our view the opinion prepared for the District Court 
of .Appeal by ,Justice McComb and concurred in by Presid-
.Justice Moore and Justice Fox (reported in (Cal . .App.) 
2GO P .2d 811), discusses and correctly resolves 
the questions presented on this appeal. For the reasons 
therein stated we would affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied July 21, 
1954. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
